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Abstract: The current mobile ecosystem is best understood in terms of a monopolistic 
competition model, characterised by heterogeneous producers providing a range of 
differentiated products for consumers with heterogeneous preferences. Product 
differentiation offers producers some market power, ultimately constrained by imperfect 
substitutes from rivals and the threat of market entry. To achieve their goals, consumers 
require a mixture of products from the network, handset and application domains. 
Reduced search and other transaction costs are a demand-side benefit of product 
bundling. Producers in this market have high fixed costs and low marginal costs. High 
fixed costs discourage entry, which increases the market power of producers. Low 
marginal costs and uncorrelated customer preferences across products for individual 
consumers encourage producers to expand their sales using supply-side bundling. Thus 
there are strong supply and demand side benefits from product bundling. We argue that 
producers will compete in terms of differentiated bundles combining network, handset and 
application features, with branding as the essential strategy for bundle differentiation. 
Successful business strategies will require direct access to customers and information 
about their specific preferences. For illustration, we look at the currently apparent 
strategies of Google, Apple and Nokia. The mobile ecosystem is complex but not unique. 
Strong parallels can be drawn between the mobile ecosystem and the television 
ecosystem. Google appears to be following a "free to air" strategy and Apple a "pay TV" 
strategy in bundle differentiation. Television manufacturers are largely undifferentiated and 
have little market power: this may be the fate of handset manufacturers and network 
operators who are comparatively powerless to withstand the evolutionary development of 
the mobile ecosystem. 
Key words: Business ecosystem, platform, monopolistic competition, product bundling, 
heterogeneous demand, business strategies, mobile telephony, mobile applications, 
branding, price discrimination. 
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  Introduction 
General features of monopolistic competition 
The current mobile ecosystem is best understood in terms of the 
monopolistic competition model of interaction amongst consumers and 
producers 1. This pattern of interaction is distinct from perfect competition, in 
which consumers view products as perfect substitutes for each other, and 
consumers are only differentiated by the utility they place on the products as 
expressed by their willingness to pay. In markets based upon perfect 
competition, competitive strategies focus predominantly upon price. 
Consumers strive to seek out the cheapest provider of a homogeneous 
product and providers face strong incentives to reduce their costs of 
producing this good to the lowest possible level.  
By contrast, monopolistic competition patterns of interaction emerge 
where producers supply a range of differentiated products to consumers with 
varying tastes and preferences for the different product varieties. 
Heterogeneity of consumers' tastes is essential for monopolistic competition 
to develop. Products can be differentiated on both tangible or intangible 
characteristics - what matters is that consumers believe that the products 
differ on attributes other than price. Potentially, all consumers can be 
matched to the variant that best suits their individual preferences. 
Consumers with a strong preference for the characteristics upon which a 
specific variant is differentiated do not perceive rival (differentiated) products 
as close substitutes. A degree of market power is thereby conferred upon 
the producer of each variant, in respect to those consumers who strictly 
prefer it to its rivals. Producer market power is ultimately constrained by 
imperfect substitutes produced by rivals and the threat of market entry by a 
variant that even more closely matches the consumer's preference than the 
current best. However, the presence of market power does not mean that 
producers can charge prices above their actual long-run average costs. As 
long as entry is unrestricted, rents can be competed away by substitution to 
functionally equivalent variants competing on price, or new variants that 
better match individual consumer preferences.  
                     
1 The theory of monopolistic competition is credited to CHAMBERLIN (1962) and ROBINSON 
(1933). A good recent exposition can be found in CARLTON & PERLOFF (2005). 
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Monopolistic competition predominates in markets for products where 
fixed and sunk costs are large in proportion to marginal costs and each 
producer faces a downward-sloping average cost curve over the relevant 
quantity. Thus it will apply to network, handset and application producers in 
the mobile ecosystem as they all face the high fixed and sunk costs and low 
marginal costs inherent in network infrastructure, technology and software 
development. With monopolistic competition, the optimal number of firms 
decreases as the quantum of fixed costs rises. The number of firms 
operating will usually be either higher or lower than the efficient number.  If 
fixed costs are very large and predominantly sunk, only a very small number 
of firms will participate, and there will likely be fewer firms than optimal as 
the risks of sunk capital being lost in the event of over-supply are significant. 
On the other hand, if fixed and sunk costs are low, the risks associated with 
over-supply are much less, leading to much higher likelihood of entry 
occurring. If the firms entering do not accurately assess the effect on the 
residual demand curve of their own and other firms' entry (to the extent that 
there is partial substitutability between the variants), there will likely be more 
entry than is efficient. Some firms will have to exit, with the consequence 
that any sunk capital is lost. Whilst the loss incurred by each firm that exits 
my be small, if there are many such firms, the quantity lost may be quite 
large in total (CARLTON & PERLOFF, 2005). 
Industries characterised by monopolistic competition tend to exhibit fierce 
competition at the margins, as each firm endeavours to inform consumers of 
its specific characteristics in order to attract those consumers for whom it is 
the best match and persuade consumers with less firm preferences (i.e. 
more elastic demand) that its variant best matches their individual tastes. 
The intensity of competition is likely to be greater the more elastic the 
consumer demands and the less consumers know about the product (so the 
less likely it is that their preferences have been well-formed).  
Specific features of telecommunications and information industries 
Producers of telecommunications and information products typically need 
to make large fixed investments in order to be able to offer any product at all. 
Furthermore, most of the fixed costs are sunk, as they pertain to 
unrecoverable installation costs (networks), research and development and 
design (handsets and application software). However, once the required 
infrastructure is in place (or the content or technology has been developed) 
the marginal cost of provision is small (and very close to zero in the case of 
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software applications). These characteristics lead inevitably to the 
downward-sloping average cost curves and other features characteristic of 
monopolistically competitive markets. Pricing needs to be set in such a way 
that the costs of the fixed investment are covered over time (or at least 
enough is recouped to fund the next generation of technology before the 
current one becomes obsolete).  
Low marginal costs combined with a degree of market power makes 
pricing strategies such as price discrimination and bundling very attractive. 
In addition to market power, price discrimination (charging different prices to 
consumers for the same product or service) requires that the provider has 
sufficient information available to separate consumers into different groups 
on the basis of their different demand elasticities and has some ability to 
prevent resale between the two groups (CARLTON & PERLOFF, 2005). 
Mobile network operators are able to separate consumers on the basis of 
billing information (business consumers are generally more price-inelastic 
than residential consumers) and calling patterns (those making fewer or 
shorter calls are likely more price-sensitive). Resale can be prevented by 
selling services on account to a named consumer who remains liable for all 
charges incurred regardless of who makes the call.  
Bundling 
Bundling two or more products together also relies upon differences in 
consumer valuations of the goods concerned, but unlike price discrimination, 
does not necessitate the producer knowing exactly how each consumer 
values each product in the bundle 2. Assume two products are offered for 
sale separately for price x, or together in a bundle for x+y (y<x). If at least 
one product in the bundle is valued by the consumer above x (say, x+s), the 
consumer receives surplus s above the price paid for the good alone. This 
surplus can be used to offset the welfare derived from the purchase of the 
second product. The consumer may not value the second product 
sufficiently to purchase it at x, (say it is valued at x-z). However, the 
consumer will purchase the bundle as long as x-y>z-s. The producer will sell 
more of the less-valued product in a bundle than if the goods were sold 
separately. Moreover, the producer does not need to know which product 
each consumer values above the single product price. A consumer valuing 
                     
2 The economics of bundling is credited to STIGLER (1963) and ADAMS & YELLEN (1976). 
See BAKOS & BRYNJOLFSSON (1999) for a literature review. 
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product 1 more highly will use the surplus on that product to offset the 
purchase of product 2, just as a consumer valuing product 2 more highly will 
use the surplus on it to offset the purchase of product 1. Consumer welfare 
is unambiguously increased relative to the case of single price selling. As 
long as the costs of production of both products are less than the bundled 
price, the strategy also results in increased profits.  
Bundling is most profitable for producers when customer valuations of the 
two goods are negatively correlated and the goods are offered via mixed 
bundling (i.e. each can be bought separately or the two can be purchased as 
a bundle depending upon consumer valuations). However, if consumer 
valuations are positively correlated (both goods valued highly or both lowly), 
bundling will result in lost profits from the sale of the second good at a 
discounted price when the consumer would have been prepared to pay the 
full price. Bundling can still be a profitable strategy even when customer 
valuations of individual goods are highly correlated, but not to the same 
underlying variables (BAKOS & BRYNJOLFSSON, 1999). In general it is 
necessary to increase the number of goods in the bundle under these 
circumstances. 
Discounting handsets to mobile telephony account customers is a classic 
example of bundling. For most consumers, the ability to make calls (i.e. the 
account) is the more highly-valued service (indeed, calls cannot be made 
without an account being purchased). A new handset with enhanced 
features can be purchased at a stand-alone price. However, unless the 
enhanced features are especially highly valued, the consumer will probably 
find the existing handset sufficient for the primary, highly-valued uses 
(calling and SMS), so will not purchase a new handset. However, handset 
upgrading can be induced amongst low handset valuers by bundling 
handsets and accounts. The same customers will purchase the handset 
when offered in this manner as they are utilising surplus from the highly 
valued service (calling) to offset the lower valuation of the handset. Finnish 
evidence confirms this rationale. When regulations prevented network 
operators from bundling handsets with accounts, Finland had a very old 
handset stock in use. However, when the regulations were removed, the 
average age of handsets in use reduced dramatically (TALLBERG et al., 
2007).  
Indeed, two-part tariffs as utilised on mobile markets are a complex 
combination of both price discrimination and bundling. On one level, a 
mobile telephone account is a bundle of a connection and usage. Some 
individuals value connection highly (in effect the option to make and receive 
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calls when required), but make few calls because each is valued lowly. 
Others value calling highly. Multiple call plans with different combinations of 
fixed fee and usage charges (often in 'buckets' of minutes or megabytes) 
enable consumers to self-select the bundle that gives them the most surplus 
given individual valuations and usage patterns. Some consumers are also 
extremely price-sensitive with respect to connection (demand is elastic), but 
value calling very highly (demand is inelastic). They can be separated by 
selling accounts with no fixed monthly component at all - the classic 'prepay' 
accounts. These consumers do not value connection highly enough to pay 
for a monthly account at any positive price (perhaps because they lack the 
certainty of being able to make a regular monthly commitment to pay). The 
very high per-call charges these consumers pay (substantially above cost) is 
a form of price discrimination that is facilitated by bundling to the point where 
all of the costs of both services are combined entirely within the price paid 
for (and value of) calls (HAUSMAN & SIDAK, 2004). If the bundle was not 
valued above the price of the calls, these consumers would eschew mobile 
services entirely. That they purchase pre-pay but not post-pay accounts 
confirms their valuations of each component.   
The bundling of goods with zero or low marginal costs can create 
significant economies of scope (BAKOS & BRYNJOLFSSON, 1999). This 
result holds even in the absence of technological economies in production, 
distribution or consumption - all of which can be found in the mobile 
ecosystem. The benefits of bundling grow as the number of goods in the 
bundle increases - offering profit advantages to firms that can create or 
coordinate larger bundles than their rivals (BAKOS & BRYNJOLFSSON, 
2000). The benefit is greatest when the cost of the additional feature is 
essentially zero (PARKER & VAN ALSTYNE, 2005). This characteristic is 
evidenced in telecommunications and information industries principally in 
respect of the very low marginal costs of reproduction of software. 
Differentiation of handset features is increasingly evidenced in the bundling 
of low-cost applications based principally upon software. It makes very little 
difference to the cost of the handset whether these features are included or 
excluded. Their inclusion widens the appeal of the handset to all consumers 
who value one of the features (without the handset producer knowing ex 
ante which specific features will attract which consumers). Nonetheless, 
handsets are still 'versioned' to enable some form of price discrimination to 
be practised - high-featured bundles sold at high prices for those with high 
valuations of the features, and low-featured bundles sold to the price-
conscious consumers who place a low value on the extra features. Similar 
characteristics pertain to software sold separately as applications. Indeed, 
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software is often sold in 'versioned' forms (e.g. 'student', 'professional') that 
contain essentially identical bundles of code, but with switches set to prevent 
access to some features in the bundle. 
Bundling is also an effective strategy for deterring entry from specialist 
competitors who cannot provide all elements of the bundle (NALEBUFF, 
2004). By offering only a pure bundle of products 1 and 2, a monopolist can 
earn more profits than by offering 1 and 2 separately and simultaneously 
deter entry from firms offering only 1 or 2. This strategy remains optimal 
post-entry. This effect can outweigh the price-discrimination advantages of 
bundling, and is strongest when customer valuations of the elements of the 
bundle are positively correlated. 
Other features 
Markets with low marginal costs where producers have market power 
also tend to 'tippy', in the sense that a producer with a small advantage in 
market share has a large advantage in profits. Applying that profit advantage 
back into product improvement can create a virtuous cycle resulting in 
market dominance. Markets with strong network effects can also be tippy 
(SHY, 2001). These features are evidenced in operating systems markets, 
which are typified by a single dominant firm. 
High fixed costs discourage entry, which increases the market power of 
producers. This characteristic is evidenced in the very small number of 
network operators in most markets. Whilst virtual network operators have 
emerged as a consequence of regulatory provisions to increase competition, 
they are still reliant upon a very small number of physical networks to 
provide their services. There is little evidence that virtual operators grow to 
the point of investing in their own networks as per the 'ladder of investment' 
model (CAVE, 2006). Rather, as network technology features (coverage, 
quality) provide the main source of product differentiation in the mobile 
market, and hence define the customer groups who will value the 
differentiated features most, the main purpose of virtual operators appears to 
be to provide price competition and hence competitive discipline to the 
network operator from which they purchase their services. Indeed, their low-
cost entry model would suggest that, via the monopolistic competition model, 
there will be over-many entering as a consequence of their low fixed costs, 
many will exit, and therefore it would be unwise for them to invest any capital 
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at all as long as they can lease access from network operators at 
(potentially) regulated rates (HAUSMAN & SIDAK, 2005).  
SHAPIRO & VARIAN (1999) describe the importance of technical 
standards to support interoperability in information industries. Standards are 
used (or ignored) on a strategic basis by producers, who choose to support 
interoperability with their rivals' products on a product-by-product basis. As a 
general rule, multi-homing (supporting connectivity to multiple standards) 
can be an effective way of undermining the market power of rivals with 
related products, whereas single-homing (or locking out rivals) can be an 
effective tactic for increasing a producer's own market power. 
Expected industry structure in the mobile ecosystem 
Under these circumstances we can expect to see the emergence of a 
dominant firm for each product or key bundles of products. The dominant 
firm will be constrained by a competitive fringe of niche players who provide 
more specialised products to niche consumers. These niche players may, of 
course, be the dominant firm supplying a product in a nearby market. 
  The mobile ecosystem 
A categorization of products 
For our purposes we categorise products in the mobile ecosystem as 
residing in the handset, network and application domains. The handset 
domain encompasses features requiring specific functionality in the handset, 
for example a camera or music player. The important features in the network 
domain are connectivity, geographic coverage, connection quality, reliability, 
bandwidth and latency. The application domain includes products such as 
voice, email, SMS, mapping, web browsing, searching, music, video and 
social networking. Each application product will have specific underlying 
requirements which need to be met by a combination of handset, mobile 
network, content and back-end server resources. An 'application' product is 
a wider concept than software running on the handset. It also includes 
products that are primarily content, e.g. a pay-per-track music store. 
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Evolutionary trends 
The original mobile ecosystem can be considered as covering only two of 
these domains, as the only application provided (voice) was inextricably 
bound with the network. The network operator controlled the relationship 
with the customers, so managed the information and therefore any ability to 
engage in price discrimination. Whilst there were technological differences in 
network characteristics, market power emerged principally from the 
economics associated with high fixed costs. Whilst consumers might have 
had preferences for specific handset features, network operators could 
ultimately determine which handsets could be used on their networks. 
Network operators utilised their market power to engage in both price 
discrimination and supply side bundling - handsets plus network access - as 
sales strategies to increase their own market share. These relationships are 
depicted in Figure 1. 
Figure 1 - Early mobile ecosystem 
 
At the present time we observe convergence occurring in the network 
domain as competing network operators increasingly standardise on 
common network technologies (for example, in Australia and New Zealand, 
where historically both GSM and CDMA networks have operated, the CDMA 
operators have moved away from this technology in favour of 
standardisation with their competitors). Differentiation is occurring in the 
handset domain as new operating systems are developed for these devices 
and features from other portable electronic devices are added to the bundle. 
The application domain is characterised by a very high degree of 
differentiation, albeit based upon common standards for computer operating 
systems, browser functionality and internet addressing.  
Producers who operate solely in the network domain face three essential 
problems. The first is that any technical differentiation in new network 
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technologies are being undone by multi-homing handsets 3. Consumers 
prefer - and have demanded and received via regulatory processes - the 
ability to roam across different networks. Smart software now enables them 
to select the optimal network for specific uses. The second is emerging 
applications that do all their communication over the IP layer 4 - removing 
the ability of the network provider to price discriminate based on the 
application type and hence customer valuations for different applications, as 
has occurred in the past. The third is that the technical parameters on which 
they compete are fast approaching the point where there is little if any 
benefit to the consumer from further improvement. For example, once round-
trip latency falls below approximately 20ms, further improvements are 
unnoticeable to the user. Similarly there are virtually no consumer benefits to 
additional bandwidth once the point where a video can be downloaded faster 
that it can be played back 5. Current levels of mobile network technology 
already approach these thresholds, though that technology remains to be 
widely deployed. 
Producers operating solely in the handset domain (e.g. Nokia) also face 
difficulties. They are operating in a bounded ecosystem in which they do not 
control the ongoing relationships with the majority of their customers, relative 
to the network operators who have very frequent interactions and hence the 
ability to gather information on customer preferences. This inhibits their 
ability to control price discrimination and bundling. It is noted that it has been 
the network operators who bundle the handset with network connectivity, 
and not the handset manufacturers who bundle network connectivity with the 
handset. The second problem is that the proliferation of product variants that 
has been an essential part of their strategy to date has become a major 
hindrance to their ability to attract and implement third-party applications. A 
third-party developer for the iPhone needs to test their application on a 
maximum of three iPhone models, whereas a developer for Nokia's 
Symbian-based phones might potentially need to test on hundreds of 
                     
3 For example, the iPhone 3G S supports ten wireless communication protocols/frequency 
bands, and six email protocols. 
4 E.g. Google Voice and Skype. The technology to do voice over IP also exists in current 
iPhone models and is useable over WiFi connections, presumably the only reason it has not 
been enabled over cellular data connections is because of Apple’s contractual relationship with 
mobile network operators. 
5 The only obvious exceptions to these cases are (1) where an application is poorly written, 
thus requiring multiple round-trips where one would suffice, and (2) where the consumer wishes 
to download a large file for offline use. We can expect that selection pressure from consumers 
will in time weed out (1), and the improving geographic coverage of mobile networks over time 
will reduce the number of situations where (2) is valuable. 
D. HEATLEY & B. HOWELL 89 
models. Google's Android platform can be expected to suffer from similar 
problems as with Symbian over time, because of the incentives for handset 
manufacturers to differentiate their Android-based handset offerings. 
The consumer is part of the ecosystem 
Ultimately it is the application that is of interest to consumers. The 'killer 
application' of the early mobile ecosystem was voice connectivity. This 
required both a handset and a network connection, and was sold typically in 
that bundle. 
Customers have turned out to be very heterogeneous in their use of 
mobile phones (VERKASALO & HAMMAINEN, 2007). There are strong 
distinctions between heavy SMS users, heavy voice users, those who value 
their phone for incoming connectivity and those who value them for outgoing 
connectivity. Some frequently upgrade their handsets to obtain the latest 
features whereas others buy a cheap handset and use it until technical 
failure or obsolescence forces them to upgrade. This heterogeneity has only 
increased with the emergence of new applications. For example, email is an 
essential application for some users (witness the emergence of the 
Blackberry), but of little utility to many others. 
While voice (and its related social connectivity partner SMS) are still 
highly valued by consumers today (ODLYZKO, 2009), there is no single 
'killer application' of the current mobile ecosystem. The new 'killer 
application' is instead, we suggest, a 'killer bundle' that takes advantage of 
the extreme heterogeneity of consumers' preferences and valuations of the 
services supported by the ecosystem. Firms with a direct relationship with 
their customers are able to collect information about their relative 
preferences and thus are best positioned to take advantage of the 
heterogeneity in customer demand. 
Bundling as a strategy 
There are strong supply- and demand-side benefits from product 
bundling in the mobile ecosystem. To achieve their goals, consumers require 
a mixture of products from the network, handset and application domains. 
Reduced search and other transaction costs are a demand-side benefit of 
product bundling. The provision of a more consistent user interface across 
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multiple applications reduces consumer learning and support costs. There 
are also substantial practical benefits for a consumer from a single device 
that can provide functions previously found in separate devices, e.g. a 
phone, camera, music player, GPS and video camera. In an environment 
where technical compatibility between and across products and applications 
is a risk for the consumer, a bundle provides an implicit guarantee of 
interoperability between elements of the bundle. Low marginal costs and 
negatively correlated demand preferences across products for individual 
consumers encourage producers to maximize their profits using supply-side 
bundling. Information goods are inherently copy-able (or 'infinitely 
expansible' - QUAH, 2003). An effective strategy to reduce unauthorised 
copying is to bundle (or indeed 'tie' in a 'pure bundle') information goods with 
a physical good (e.g. Microsoft sells the majority of its copies of Windows 
pre-loaded on a PC). The ticket can be 'clipped' for an information good 
distributed this way whereas if supplied via other means (e.g. over the 
internet) the ability to enforce payment is substantially reduced (or may be 
extremely costly to undertake). In the mobile ecosystem a producer can also 
add value by including in their bundle free content from other producers, 
including competitors (PARKER & VAN ALSTYNE, 2005). For example, 
Apples bundle Google Maps and Gmail connectivity with the iPhone. 
Bundling can also be used as a strategy to develop demand for new 
products for which consumers are yet to develop their own valuations. The 
inclusion of an 'unknown' product in a bundle encourages consumers to try it 
out at low risk - specifically, any consumer surplus remaining from the 
purchase of the other products in the bundle will offset the low value placed 
on an unknown risky product, meaning more will be sold in a bundle than 
when sold separately. 
Branding as a strategy 
Some key attributes of products in the mobile ecosystem are highly 
technical, and expensive for consumers to evaluate, including compatibility, 
security and the protection of privacy. Customers also fear the stranding of 
their assets due to technological obsolescence. Under such conditions brand 
reputation is a very important signal that products will be supported by an 
entity that has made a commitment (via its spending upon branding) to 
remain in the market and adhere to the values and principles that the brand 
embodies over an extended period.  
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Entry strategies 
Apple entered the mobile ecosystem via their dominant position in 
portable music. iTunes allowed reliable sales of high-quality music with 
clearly defined and allocated property rights, which had clear advantages to 
music producers and some advantages for consumers. The iPhone was 
essentially an iPod Touch with a cellular connection, adding voice, SMS and 
cellular data roaming to the previously sold bundle. Apple's initial entry 
strategy allowed exclusive bundling of their iPhones with specific network 
providers (AT&T in the US). This situation is depicted in Figure 2.  
This strategy enabled Apple to lever their market power over customers 
who valued the iPod/iPhone features and the Apple brand strongly but did 
not have strong preferences for network features to become customers of 
the exclusive network. As long as the network selected as the exclusive 
partner was already well differentiated in the characteristics that 
differentiated the Apple brand (high quality, clear property rights, reliability), 
Apple could maximise its ability to sell handsets (via network-operator 
controlled bundles) to customers who valued the network highly but the 
specific iPhone features less so, to purchase more iPhones than they would 
have done if they were sold separately.  
The new customers could then try the new features and specifically the 
applications such as iTunes about which they may previously have had 
limited knowledge, and thereby develop (or discover latent) preferences for 
these features to the extent that they would develop an ongoing preference 
for the Apple brand over other handset (and indeed, other internet-access 
appliance) brands. 
Figure 2 - Apple's entry strategy into the mobile ecosystem (exclusive network provider) 
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However, having maximised its reach across customers who were initially 
differentiated across handset and network preferences, Apple's more recent 
strategy is to decouple their products from network providers. This situation 
is depicted in Figure 3. 
Figure 3 - Apple's evolving strategy (*) 
 
 
 
(*) Note that 'applications' include those supplied directly by Apple and third-party applications 
vetted by Apple. 
This strategy is possible because customer preferences for the iPhone 
features and the applications it supports are sufficiently strong across both 
markets now for the Apple brand differentiation to confer the necessary 
market power to proceed alone. This is supported by the fact that Apple, by 
selling services via its own controlled sites, can both manage the quality of 
services provided and begin building its own relationship with the customers 
it has attracted. As these services are charged for 6, they will be purchased 
by those who value those characteristics sufficiently highly to pay a positive 
price (compared to the equivalent services offered by 'free' sites that do not 
charge and do not therefore guarantee quality or even legal title to materials 
acquired). 
Google entered via their dominant position in internet search and other 
database-backed applications. Making the Android operating system open-
source gives a cost advantage to those handset manufacturers who adopt it. 
Google bundles in other database-backed applications (e.g. location-aware 
search, maps, Latitude) and adds the Google brand to the handset. 
                     
6 The Apple AppStore also hosts free third-party apps. As these are subject to the same vetting 
and quality-control process that applies to paid apps, they offer the same benefits to 
consumers. 
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Google can selectively provide features in the Android bundle that are not 
made freely available on other handset platforms. There is, however, an 
inherent danger in this strategy. A major gap in functionality of a key 
application for a different platform (e.g. Google Maps on the iPhone) might 
encourage the platform owner to seek a second supplier for that element of 
their bundle (e.g. Microsoft's Virtual Earth), to the detriment of Google who 
would lose the associated advertising revenue. 
Google's strategy is inherently more flexible than Apple's. Independent 
handset manufacturers who produce Android-based phones may choose to 
sell them independently (Figure 4) or bundle them with network providers 
(Figure 5). The relationship between Google and the end customer may 
remain anonymous. 
Figure 4 - Google's entry strategy (with unbundled handsets) 
 
Figure 5 - Google's entry strategy (with bundled handsets) 
Handset Network Consumers
Supply-side bundle coordinated by network operator, 
who has a direct customer relationship
Applications (Google) Demand-side bundle coordinated by consumer  
Amazon is building its own mobile ecosystem based on content (books, 
newspapers and magazines), a proprietary platform (the Kindle) and a 
proprietary mobile network. From there is a small step to expand into 
telephony and the other services offered by the mobile ecosystem. 
Games consoles might provide another entry point into the mobile 
ecosystem. The Sony PSP is an obvious candidate that could easily become 
a telephony-enabled mobile gaming platform. Skype could also leverage 
their voice-over-IP technology and existing customer database to enter the 
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ecosystem with a cellular-data only phone, though the emergence of Google 
Voice may have forestalled that market opening. 
Google entered the mobile ecosystem via applications, subsequently 
adding a handset. Apple in contrast started with a handset then added 
applications. While the mode of entry may differ, the end point is the same: 
global ecosystem players will be those in control of applications, and able to 
offer consumers a bundle of application, handset and network products. 
  Competition via bundles 
We can expect that producers will compete in terms of differentiated 
bundles combining network, handset and application features, with branding 
as the essential strategy for bundle differentiation. 
BRESNAHAN & GREENSTEIN (1999) describe competition in the 
computer industry in terms of competition between platforms. PARKER & 
VAN ALSTYNE (2005) identify personal computers and game consoles as 
two-sided platforms competing for game players on the basis of preferences 
for quality over a small range of applications (game consoles) and the wide 
range of applications available (personal computers), linking this back to the 
pricing strategies used by each to differentiate both customers purchasing 
the devices and the application developers creating content. We suggest 
that these features come together in the mobile ecosystem in the form of a 
competition between bundles that draw upon the differences in customer 
preferences across the range of features in handsets, networks and 
applications.  
Table 1 contrasts selected attributes of the Apple and Google bundles 7. 
Apple's model is funded by application consumers, whereas Google's is 
funded by advertisers. 
It is highly possible that both bundles can coexist over time, just as game 
consoles continue to co-exist with personal computers, based upon 
consumer self-selection into the bundle that offers the greatest welfare for 
that particular consumer. Indeed, we predict that the outcome of Google 
                     
7 Clearly other producers and bundles currently exist in this ecosystem, however these two 
have taken reasonably polarised positions and we can contrast them without loss of generality. 
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Android / Apple iPhone competition will be a bifurcated market based upon 
the differentiations in Table 1. It remains to be seen which will be the key 
attributes that define customer loyalty. 
Table 1 - Selected attributes of the Apple and Google bundles 
 Apple/iPhone Google/Android 
High quality  Universality 
Clean property rights Free - take what you get 
Trustworthy 
Takes responsibility  
Open access -  
get the good and the bad 
Mediated Peer-to-peer 
Brand values 
Consistent 
Highly useable 
Less consistent, at some cost 
of usability 
Third party access Regulated and quality 
controlled 
Unrestricted 
Specialists Generalists 
Dislike of advertising Open to advertising 
Time poor Time rich 
Target consumer 
attributes 
Price inelastic Price elastic 
Customer relationship Direct Anonymous 
Core content Paid music and videos Search and mapping 
Payment Cash Eyeballs (viewing advertising) 
If a single producer was to become dominant, it would be the one with 
the bundle that was cheap enough, or their single-homed applications were 
valuable enough, and there was a sufficiently large weight of preference 
amongst consumers generally for those features, to capture the entire 
middle ground of the market. Other producers would be left to serve niche 
markets. Nonetheless, both the dominant firm and the niche producers 
would continue to exist serving their own consumer base.  
  Parallels with the TV market 
There are strong parallels between the mobile ecosystem and the 
television market. Televisions multi-home (they can receive content from 
multiple broadcasters). Programme producers produce bundles of branded 
content (called channels) and we also observe further bundling of channels.  
The television manufacturing industry itself is barely monopolistically 
competitive. There in some evidence of brand preference but ultimately little 
to distinguish the offerings of one manufacturer from another over time. 
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These manufacturers can be expected to earn little more than zero 
economic profit. 
Two major business models have evolved for content: free to air 
programming paid for by advertising (think Google) and the pay TV model 
with direct payment for services (think Apple). Interestingly the free-to-air 
model preceded the pay TV model, though the two models appear to co-
exist in a stable configuration at the present time. 
  Strategic weaknesses 
Geographically-based telecommunications networks are already subject 
to intrusive regulation in most developed countries. Typically regulators 
reduce the ability of networks to use the obvious economic tools to increase 
their economic profits: bundling, price discrimination, restricting access to 
competitors and consumers lock-in. 
In the longer term, it is difficult to see how geographically-discrete 
networks subject to regulatory scrutiny will be able to wield sufficient market 
power to control the bundle (for example, Apple's exclusive network deals 
would likely be considered anticompetitive by industry-specific regulators in 
some countries). The major strategic weakness facing network operators is 
the bargaining power available to the global ecosystem players. For 
example, Apple could build its own networks (like Amazon) or become a 
virtual mobile operator, playing one operator off against another for 
discounted access for "its" customers to telecommunications networks (see 
Figure 6). 
Figure 6 - Possible future strategy for Apple or Amazon 
 
Network operators have little chance of becoming effective global 
ecosystem players, as they are subject to different regulatory environments 
in each country in which they operate (HOWELL, 2006). 
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Specialist handset manufacturers may find themselves in a similar 
position to television manufacturers over time, finding it very hard to 
differentiate themselves on attributes other than price. 
A potential weakness for Google is that there is very little customer lock-
in in their model. Advertisers can be expected to spend on any platform that 
enables consumers to be reached.  
Price-inelastic consumers are those most valuable to advertisers. If 
Google's bundles are not attractive to those consumers, advertisers may 
defect. Customers attracted to free content and services may desert Google 
if better free services appear.  
Another danger is that the unfiltered mobile ecosystem quickly evolves to 
contain too much junk. 'Junk' in this sense is anything that has negative 
value for the consumer (e.g. advertisements, pornography, or low-quality 
applications and content). Improvements in search technology can only do 
so much without enough reliable information about individual consumers to 
effectively segment them. Whether Google's largely anonymous customer 
base is willing to forego that level of privacy remains to be seen. 
Apple's model allows the collection of a substantial amount of information 
about each iPhone consumer. Apple requires signup for iTunes account with 
customer credit card information before allowing any apps (including free 
apps) to be downloaded to an iPhone. Apple has a full record of every app 
installed and upgraded, along with every music track and video purchased 
from iTunes for each consumer. This is extremely detailed information from 
a marketing perspective; however privacy concerns may limit the extent to 
which Apple can exploit this information for marketing purposes. 
Apple has shown that it can drive prices down aggressively (D'AVENI, 
2007) and capture a broad consumer market with their iPod product line. It 
remains to be seen whether they can achieve the same result with the 
iPhone. 
  Conclusion 
The monopolistic competition model offers a good explanation of current 
firm behaviour in the mobile ecosystem and a basis for the prediction of 
future developments. We believe that heterogeneous consumer demand 
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means that successful producers will compete in bundles that include 
products from the handset, network and application domains. These bundles 
will be differentiated by strong branding that reflects the values of the 
producers. 
To fully capitalise on these strategies requires information sufficient to 
manage the customer relationship. Apple is in a strong position to gain this 
information via a direct relationship with their customers, in comparison with 
Google's more anonymous customer relations. 
Network operators and handset manufacturers are not in a strong 
position to offer comprehensive bundles. Their market power in the mobile 
ecosystem can be expected to diminish over time.  
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